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Talks : Mabo lecture
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A fair go in an age of terror: Countering the terrorist threat
to human rights and the Australian identity
Frank Brennan SJ AO
People, Indentity & Place
Inaugural Eddie Koiki Mabo Lecture
Launched by Mrs Bonita Mabo
Sir George Kneipp Auditorium (HLT)
James Cook University
25 May 2004
Honouring Eddie Koiki Mabo
We are gathered on the eve of National Sorry Day. On Thursday we
will mark the anniversary of the 1967 referendum; and next week
we will celebrate the twelfth anniversary of the Mabo decision.
On Friday, at Reconciliation Place in Canberra, Minister Amanda
Vanstone will unveil a monument to the Stolen Generation though
the government will not acknowledge that term and they were not
prepared to unveil the monument on Sorry Day itself. The inscription
will read:
For 150 years until the 1970s, many thousands of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander children were removed from their families,
with the authorisation of Australian governments, to be raised
in institutions, or fostered or adopted by non-indigenous families.
Some were given up by parents seeking a better life for their
children. Many were forcibly removed and see themselves as ‘the
stolen generations’.
Many of these children experienced overwhelming grief, and the
loss of childhood and innocence, family and family relationships,
identity, language and culture, country and spirituality.
Their elders, parents and communities have experienced fear and
trauma, emptiness, dis-empowerment, endless grieving, shame and
failure.
Most who looked after the removed children believed they were
offering them a better future, and did all they could to provide
loving care. Some abused and exploited the children.
This place honours the people who have suffered under these policies
and practices. It also honours those Indigenous and non-Indigenous
people whose genuine care softened the tragic impact of what are
now recognised as cruel and misguided policies.
I am tremendously honoured to deliver this inaugural Eddie Koiki
Mabo lecture in the presence of Bonita Mabo, and here in Townsville.
It was in this city in 1982 that I first met Eddie and he explained
to me the basis of his case. And he was proved right. Eddie had
read Justice Blackburn's decision in Milirrpum v Nabalco. He thought
Blackburn got it wrong. But then he argued that even if the High
Court agreed with Blackburn, the case of the Torres Strait Islanders
was distinguishable for two reasons. First, Torres Strait Islanders
were not traditionally hunters and gatherers. They cultivated vegetable
gardens and lived in huts in settled villages, thereby having individual
interests in discrete blocks of land rather than communal interests
in vast tracts of country. Second, the Queensland crown as sovereign
had continued to recognise Torres Strait interests in land. The
Queensland government had even set up courts to determine land disputes
between islanders even though no land titles had been granted by
the crown. I remember Eddie nursing the grievance that public servants
in Brisbane or Thursday Island had asserted the power to deny him
access to his island home even on the occasion of the death of a
close relative. He had a passion for putting right an ancient wrong
and the imagination and bold vision to see it through to the highest
court in the land. It is one of the tragic ironies of the law that
Eddie did not establish his own native title claim in the end but
he did provide the vehicle for a declaration of native title by
the nation's highest court. Tonight I salute Bonita and the Mabo
children as they keep alive the memory of one of the great Australian
reformers.
Tonight, just a week off the twelfth anniversary, we are justified
in celebrating the Mabo decision which recognised native
title for the first time in Australia. This groundbreaking decision
was the cause of much public debate a decade ago. Now it is simply
accepted as part of the nation's legal landscape though it did change
the fundamental law of the land, discarding the two hundred year
old terra nullius mindset. The decision has withstood the
test of time because it is in accordance with contemporary Australian
values. Universal respect for property and the principle of non-discrimination
might even be thought to be “the vibe of the Constitution” to quote
the defining movie of contemporary cultural norms The Castle.
At first, the mining industry led by Hugh Morgan was very concerned
that the combined effect of the judgment and the Racial Discrimination
Act could be a massive slowdown in mining and exploration.
Western Australian Premier Richard Court joined the mining chorus
because over half the State was unalienated land which could be
subject to native title claim and much of it was thought to be rich
in minerals. Ian McLachlan, the federal Coalition's most trenchant
critic of the Mabo decision, after travelling to the Torres
Strait said, "It is perfectly obvious to me that those people
have owned that land forever as history has been recorded. But
it is different to say that all over Australia we should have a
feast for lawyers."
By Christmas 1993, Prime Minister Paul Keating had cut a deal with
the key Aboriginal leaders and the Senate, having failed to cut
any deal with the Opposition Coalition parties nor with the State
governments. Keating appreciated four significant effects of Mabo:
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The decision was basically a judicious realignment of the common
law developed by judges to match the historical reality with
the historic land grievance which for the first time had come
before the highest court in the land. The decision posed no
threat to sovereignty nor to the Treasury coffers.
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The decision was an honest acknowledgement that most Aborigines
had been long dispossessed of their lands and any restitution
or compensation was a matter for parliaments rather than the
courts.
-
The decision provided an historic opportunity to put right
those wrongs of the past which could be put right and to acknowledge
those wrongs which forever stained the nation's identity. This
could be done without any threat to any other person's land
rights or legitimate economic interests.
-
The decision, combined with the make-up of the Senate, provided
a unique opportunity for a negotiated settlement of the nation's
longstanding land rights question with Aborigines at the negotiating
table in the Cabinet room and holding some of their own trump
cards.
Noel Pearson, one of the key Aboriginal negotiators, summed up
the effect of the decision in light of the negotiations that followed:
"There could be no more peaceful a proposition for peace than
the one put forward by the High Court."
The Parliament set up a land fund for the purchase of
lands on the open market for the benefit of those Aborigines who
had lost their traditional lands. By the end of this year, that
fund will be self-perpetuating, allowing purchases of $45 million
each year. There is now a National Native Title Tribunal with almost
600 applications in the pipeline, half of which are going through
mediation. And the government funds Aboriginal representative
bodies which have their own advisers. Marcia Langton, another of
the original Aboriginal negotiators says, "What’s become clear
is that whereas litigation is costly and time consuming, agreement-making
costs less and is more timely."
Both the Howard and Keating governments have tried their hands
at legislative responses to the High Court's native title decisions.
Early in his term as Prime Minister, John Howard told Parliament
that Mabo "now with the passage of time, seems completely
unexceptionable to me. It appears to have been based on a good
deal of logic and fairness and proper principle.” The dust has
settled. The decision is not seen as a revolution but as a belated
common sense piece of legal reasoning. Hugh Morgan's 1994 declaration
now seems a little melodramatic: “In Mabo, and all that followed
from it, we are engaged in a struggle for the political and territorial
future of Australia.” On the tenth anniversary, Tim Shanahan, CEO,
Chamber of Minerals and Energy (WA) said, "Mining companies
in the early days weren’t as sanguine or accepting of native title.
These days it’s seen as part of the normal business of mining."
Native title is here to stay, helping to put right what Justices
Deane and Gaudron described as our "national legacy of unutterable
shame". The High Court still has its work cut out interpreting
the fine print of the excessively amended Native Title Act
and filling in the detail of common law native title, no doubt providing
some feasting for lawyers. Justice Brennan, who wrote the lead judgment
in Mabo, told an international judges' conference in 1995,
"The post-colonial relationship of the indigenous population
with their traditional land is not only, or even chiefly, a problem
for the courts. But the courts, sensitive to the demands of justice
for minorities and the disadvantaged in society, are likely to remain
a forum in which indigenous peoples will seek to right what are
now perceived to be historic wrongs." Indigenous communities
still have their problems and we still have a national problem in
reconciling ourselves. The denial of land rights and the failure
to accord equal protection and respect under the law are no longer
part of the Australian solution. That is a better starting point
than the terra nullius mindset which preceded Mabo.
In August 2002, ten years after Mabo, the High Court of
Australia gave judgment in Ward v Commonwealth, the
case dealing with the claim by the Miriuwung and Gajerrong People
to lands in the Kimberly including part of the Ord River scheme.
Justice McHugh who is the only judge who decided the Mabo
case still sitting on the High Court had cause to look back over
the history of native title litigation as it has unfolded since
Wik in 1996. He upset Aboriginal leaders like Noel Pearson
when he said:
Wik is one of the most controversial decisions given by
this Court. It subjected the Court to unprecedented criticism
and abuse, though the criticism and abuse were mild compared to
that directed to the United States Supreme Court after its two
decisions in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka.
The current state of the law of native title "can hardly
be described as satisfactory". The present case took 83 days
to hear at first instance and 15 days on appeal to the Full Court
of the Federal Court. The orders of the majority Justices in these
appeals now send the case back to the Federal Court for further
hearing. Further evidence may be taken, and further litigation
in this Court is a possibility. The Yorta Yorta case took
even longer to hear at first instance - 114 days. The
dispossession of the Aboriginal peoples from their lands was a
great wrong. Many people believe that those of us who are the
beneficiaries of that wrong have a moral responsibility to redress
it to the extent that it can be redressed. But it is becoming
increasingly clear - to me, at all events - that redress can not
be achieved by a system that depends on evaluating the competing
legal rights of landholders and native-title holders. The deck
is stacked against the native-title holders whose fragile rights
must give way to the superior rights of the landholders whenever
the two classes of rights conflict. And it is a system that is
costly and time-consuming. At present the chief beneficiaries
of the system are the legal representatives of the parties. It
may be that the time has come to think of abandoning the present
system, a system that simply seeks to declare and enforce the
legal rights of the parties, irrespective of their merits. A better
system may be an arbitral system that declares what the rights
of the parties ought to be according to the justice and
circumstances of the individual case.
Now Justice McHugh was one of the majority in the original Mabo
decision in which the court by 6 to 1 recognised native title.
Since then a newly constituted court and governments of both political
persuasions have had the opportunity to rule and legislate on native
title.
It may be just too convenient to be able to dismiss McHugh’s remarks
as if he were a disillusioned judge growing more conservative.
Similar sentiments are expressed by Hal Wootten who enjoys the finest
reputation amongst the nation’s indigenous leaders. He has surveyed
the way that land rights and stolen generation questions were left
for determination in the courts and concludes:
To leave the consequences of these policies to litigation in
private actions based on existing rights, in courts designed to
settle legal rights by an adversary system within a relatively
homogeneous community, is at once an insult to the indigenous
people and a prostitution of the courts. It is an insult to indigenous
people because what is at stake is not the vindication of rights
that they possessed, but redress for what happened to them when
they were accorded no rights. (Litigation such as Mabo
and Wik) developed as a result of a failure of political
nerve, which left what should have been a legislative policy issue
to resolution in the courts as an issue of existing rights. In
Mabo the High Court eloquently and bravely confronted the
fiction of terra nullius and its consequences, but could only
rule on legal rights, and then only in a way that did not fracture
the skeletal structure of the invader’s law. Instead of rising
to the challenge of creating a new indigenous policy that could
deliver more just outcomes in contemporary conditions, parliament
simply cemented the crippled structure of existing rights into
the Native Title Act 1993. It left an avenue of escape
from the strait jacket in the mediation process. However, instead
of accepting the opportunity that mediation offers to go beyond
existing rights to seek a mutually beneficial solution, governments
refused to negotiate except about whether claimants could establish
the existing rights they were forced to claim, and went to the
courts to exploit every argument to defeat those rights. The
shards of the Mabo aspiration lie around us in new case names
that threaten to usurp its household status, at least in some
Aboriginal communities – Yorta Yorta, de Rose, Ward, Wilson,
Yarmirr.”
There have now been more than enough test cases in the courts,
determining the extinguishment of native title on Western lands
leases in New South Wales, but leaving open the possibility of native
title on pastoral leases in Queensland, Northern Territory, Western
Australia and South Australia; upholding the possibility of sea
rights but rejecting all exclusive rights to sea and ensuring that
the sea rights of all other persons are unaffected; and requiring
an ongoing connection with the land despite the effects of dispossession
and colonization. How many more test cases do we need before state
and Commonwealth governments are prepared to sit down and negotiate
sensible arrangements with traditional owners.? It is good that
there has finally been a settlement of the Yorta Yorta claim in
Victoria, despite the trauma and cost of the fruitless litigation.
More than 25% of the Kimberly is now recognized as native title.
But isn’t it time there, and in Cape York, as in the Northern Territory
to sit down with the traditional owners and negotiate more useful
arrangements for employment, training and survival in these remote
parts of the country?
It is timely to recall that the Keating response to Mabo
was to be a threefold full-blooded recognition of continuing native
title rights, establishment of a perpetual land fund for the purchase
and management of properties for the benefit of those who had lost
their native title rights prior to the passage of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975, and the negotiation of a social justice
package. The third item has never materialized. As of July last
year, the Indigenous Land Corporation has purchased 162 properties
involving 5.1 million hectares at a cost of $136 million, of which
110 have been divested to Indigenous corporations.
The ILC estimates that 60,000 indigenous Australians derive some
benefit from these purchases. However only about one thousand persons
are receiving a direct tangible benefit such as residence (474),
full time employment (157) or part time CDEP type employment (383).
While 68% of properties were occupied, only 30% of them were providing
any employment. The issue now is not the legitimacy of land rights
but matching the land rights with the real, rather than the imagined,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander aspirations.
Having honoured the memory of Eddie Koiki Mabo, might I now turn
to the topic which I have been asked to address this evening, "A
Fair Go in An Age of Terror: Countering the terrorist threat to
human rights and the Australian identity".
When should we join with the United States in such preventive
action, without endorsement from the United Nations?
The invasion of Iraq was consistent with the previously published
neo-conservative agenda of Mr Bush's key advisers. Regime change
in Iraq was a centre-piece of their agenda. Our own Defence Intelligence
Organisation (DIO) told our parliamentary inquiry into the intelligence
operations preceding the recent war: "We made a judgement here
in Australia that the United States was committed to military action
against Iraq. We had the view that that was, in a sense, independent
of the intelligence assessment."
When tabling the unanimous, all-party report, the government member
David Jull told Parliament of the Committee's conclusion "that
there was unlikely to be large stocks of weapons of mass destruction,
certainly none readily deployable." We did not go to war because
there was an imminent threat to our security. We went to war because
the Americans asked us to. The reasons they asked us to go to war
have become a movable feast. Before the war, Prime Minister Howard
insisted, "Our goal is disarmament." "I couldn’t
justify on its own a military invasion of Iraq to change the regime.
I’ve never advocated that." The problem was that George Bush's
advisers had and that is what they got. Howard told parliament that
Iraq's "possession of chemical and biological weapons and its
pursuit of a nuclear capability poses a real and unacceptable threat
to the stability and security of our world". Walter Lewincamp,
the head of DIO, said this "was not a judgement that DIO would
have made." They just weren't asked!
Even if the United Nations Security Council be not considered formally
to be the competent, relevant authority for deciding just cause
for war, it remains a suitable sieve for processing the conflicting
claims in determining whether there is "a real and unacceptable
threat to the stability and security of our world" and whether
or not war is the only realistic resort. The French and Germans
would have a mixture of motives for their stand, just as the English
and the Americans would have for theirs. Given the mix of motives,
the elusiveness of truth, and the now admitted unreliability of
the intelligence, it would be better in future to have decisions
made by a community of disparate nations united only by a common
concern for international security against terrorism rather than
a coalition of allies who either share or are neutral about the
strategic objectives of the US administration.
Our politicians have a difficult call to make when assessing intelligence
about the likelihood of weapons of mass destruction being developed
and handed on to terrorist organisations that have no respect for
western nations. In times of crisis, we need to trust our leaders.
But it becomes more difficult to grant that trust when the rationale
for war is changed after the event. The belated emphasis on the
humanitarian concern for the Iraqi people was rank hypocrisy coming
from the United States which had first given Saddam Hussein his
WMD capacity for countering Iran and from an Australian government
which had punished Iraqi asylum seekers who had the temerity to
seek asylum within our borders. Trust in government would be better
maintained if Mr Howard simply admitted that his public rationale
for war was the honouring of the US alliance no matter what the
doubts about the wisdom of seeking Iraqi regime change without UN
endorsement, and the concern about readily deployable weapons of
mass destruction no matter what the shortcomings in the intelligence.
Prior to the Madrid bombings, many Australians thought our participation
in the war was justified because the world was now a safer place,
we had won without any Australian loss of life, and the murderous
Saddam Hussein had lost power. Post-Madrid, we have to question
whether the world is now a safer place and whether Australia is
at no greater risk of being a special target of terrorist groups.
What now are the criteria for our participation in a just war
in this Age of Terror?
A post World War II settlement of the UN Security Council configuration,
including allocated seats enjoying a permanent veto cannot be determinative
of any moral assessment about war. However when prudential assessments
of threats have to be made on intelligence against a backdrop of
continual breaches of solemn undertakings by a rogue state, the
Security Council does provide a useful sieve for getting willing
combatants over the threshold of their own self-interest and ideology
to a publicly reasoned rationale for military engagement. If western
democratic members of the Security Council cannot be convinced of
the need for war, there are good grounds for citizens to suspect
that the conditions for a just war have not been fulfilled. If such
members voted for war, there would still be a need to scrutinise
the conditions for a just war.
There was a surprising unanimity of views amongst church leaders
opposing the Iraq invasion on the grounds that it did not comply
with the just war criteria. On the eve of war, Bishop Gregory, the
head of the US Catholic Bishops Conference said:
Our bishops' conference continues to question the moral legitimacy
of any preemptive, unilateral use of military force to overthrow
the government of Iraq. To permit preemptive or preventive uses
of military force to overthrow threatening or hostile regimes
would create deeply troubling moral and legal precedents. Based
on the facts that are known, it is difficult to justify resort
to war against Iraq, lacking clear and adequate evidence of an
imminent attack of a grave nature or Iraq's involvement in the
terrorist attacks of September 11. With the Holy See and many
religious leaders throughout the world, we believe that resort
to war would not meet the strict conditions in Catholic teaching
for the use of military force.
As early as September 2002, the US bishops had told the President,
"We fear that resort to force, under these circumstances, would
not meet the strict conditions in Catholic teaching for overriding
the strong presumption against the use of military force. Of particular
concern are the traditional just war criteria of just cause, right
authority, probability of success, proportionality and noncombatant
immunity." The bishops maintained that view both in the United
States and here in Australia. So too did most church leaders and
many community leaders.
The suspected capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction is
not itself just cause for an attack. Even if a state or a coalition
of states is able to claim that it is the right authority to make
a decision about war, that authority must be able to produce credible
evidence about the possession of such weapons and the distinctive
threat they pose to those states wanting to launch an attack. If
you cannot convince the western democratic members of the UN Security
Council that there is a real threat to world peace or a real and
unacceptable threat to particular states, it is very likely that
you are not engaged in war for a just cause. Even if the coalition
of willing states be the appropriate authority, they still need
to demonstrate that all other avenues have been tried to disarm
the rogue state. If the coalition of willing states has provided
the incentive for renewed inspections by pre-deploying troops, the
coalition is entitled to put a reasonable limit on the terms of
pre-deployment or to demand that other states opposed to war provide
assistance with the pre-deployment simply to maintain the pressure
for verifiable inspections. Even if the US had established that
it was a competent authority to determine that there was a just
cause for war which was a last resort, there would still have been
a need to consider the consequences of such an engagement.
The nonchalance and belated show of humanitarian concern by the
Coalition of the Willing after they had failed to uncover large
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction confirms the suspicion
that the Coalition's leader, the United States, had an alternative
agenda, namely regime change in Iraq, an attempted re-ordering of
the Middle East, and an experiment with a new American project premised
on preventive intervention. Those who oppose such ideological experiments
in the future will do better if they are able to articulate more
clearly the margin of appreciation afforded governments which are
privy to sensitive intelligence material. Even if such opponents
fail to agree on whether the UN Security Council is the competent
authority to determine the legitimacy of war, they ought put forward
a united view that the Security Council is the most appropriate
sieve for sorting the conflicting claims made by nation states which
may be the appropriate authority. The UN Security Council is well
qualified to sift out those claims of nation states based only on
ideology or national self-interest.
The Coalition of the Willing’s failure to find any weapons of mass
destruction and its inability without UN endorsement and Arab acceptance
to impose secular democracy on factionalised Iraq give us good grounds
to return to the orthodox theory of just war, adapting the application
of the criteria to the contemporary situation.
What are the checks and balances we need to maintain our human
rights and Australian identity in an Age of Terror?
Confronted with terrorist threats reaching our shores, government
has a responsibility to arm police, defence and intelligence personnel
with the powers to protect us while respecting the civil liberties
of all persons. We Australians are now on our own with no Bill of
Rights to guide our judges or restrict our governments. But for
the government's incapacity to control the Senate, it would be able
to ram all sorts of legislation through the Parliament. Checks and
balances are often time consuming, and they often provide opportunities
for minor parties and sectional interest groups to engage in petty
point scoring. The Senate and the parliamentary committee system
worked well when the government tried to bluff the Parliament into
passing amendments to the ASIO legislation that would have entrenched
very draconian measures on our statute books in 2002. Originally
the government proposed that ASIO would be able to detain any person
incommunicado, including a child. ASIO would have been able to detain
indefinitely any person without charge or even suspicion. While
detained, any person could have been strip searched, questioned
for unlimited periods and prevented from contacting family members,
their employer or even a lawyer. They would not even be able to
inform loved ones that they had been detained. They could have been
denied legal advice.
Senator John Faulkner said that "the original ASIO bill was
perhaps the worst drafted bill ever introduced into the Australian
parliament." Thanks to the Senate, the legislation is now more
protective of human rights, more in the Australian way, while being
adapted to the present terrorist threat. There was a lengthy stand-off
between the government and the Senate over this legislation. Before
Christmas 2002 when the legislation was deadlocked John Howard warned,
"If this bill does not go through and we are not able to clothe
our intelligence agencies with this additional authority over the
summer months it will be on the head of the Australian Labor Party
and on nobody else’s head." The government then further delayed
the legislation so it could be added to the mix of a double dissolution
election, if need be. Having been introduced in March 2002, the
legislation was passed in highly amended form in June 2003. The
legislation now contains a three year sunset clause so it has to
be reviewed again by our parliamentarians after the next election.
Sir Harry Gibbs provided an assessment of the final product in his
Australia Day address to the Samuel Griffith Society. He notes that
the powers given to ASIO are "drastic" and "only
experience will show whether (the) safeguards are sufficient".
Gibbs says the law goes too far in prohibiting lawyers and others
publishing information about the questioning of any person. This
could "prevent publication of the fact that an abuse of power
or a serious error of judgment had occurred." The government
likes to portray the Senate as obstructionist but the Senate has
modified national security legislation to better protect civil liberties.
When we go through a down in the political cycle with government
encountering little opposition in the House of Representatives or
on John Laws and Alan Jones' radio programs, it is difficult to
conduct robust public dialogue about policies related to minorities
and national security. Fear and flabbiness take over. There is an
ongoing deficit in public honesty and rigorous inquiry when it comes
to debate about the morality of our engagement in war, about the
limits of ASIO's powers, about our treatment of asylum seekers and
the identification of their deprivations with national security
and border protection needs. There is an important democratic role
for unelected citizens, including church leaders, to question government's
public rationale and private purpose, to correct the misperceptions,
and to espouse rational and coherent policies that do less harm
to vulnerable people and to our peace and security. We would all
profit from more respectful and rigorous dialogue between elected
politicians and unelected community leaders, including between church
and state.
Conclusion
As the sun rose over the tip of Cape York on 12 October 1993, the
waters of the Torres Strait were exceedingly calm. As the sun glistened
on the water, Father David Passi, the Anglican Pastor of the Island
of Mer in the Murray Islands group, stood at the back of the speed
boat pointing at a small island close to the shore, "That's
Possession Island." David, a reserved man who has never been
very political, had succeeded the previous year in moving the foundations
of the Australian legal system. He and James Rice were the two
Murray Island residents who joined with Eddie Mabo and succeeded
on behalf of their people in claiming native title to their Island
of Mer.
David smiled broadly as he showed me Possession Island where James
Cook came ashore after his epic voyage up the Australian eastern
coastline, raising his King's flag and claiming possession in His
Majesty's name of all he had sailed passed. David chuckled, "Cook
had his back to the Torres Strait when he claimed possession."
Next day at Bamaga on the tip of Cape York, David explained the
significance of the Mabo decision. His people believe that
in ancient times a figure named Malo set down the law for relations
between islanders regarding their lands and waters. All islanders
speak of the myth of Malo-Bomai. Malo and his maternal uncle made
a long sea journey from West New Guinea across to Mer in the east.
These mythical heroes, Malo resembling an octopus, brought the eight
peoples or clans into one, "strengthening them with the qualities
of a diversity of sea creatures, so giving the power to match the
sea and make long journeys across Malo, the deep seas, for canoes
and for battle." In this part of Australia, the indigenous
people define themselves in relation to land, sea, each other and
seasonal time or prevailing wind.
Fr Passi, known also as Kebi Bala, explains Malo's law: "For
thousands of years we have owned the land and Malo who was the Meriam
centre of it made sure that members of the society were given land.
They are our laws. We have Malo ra Gelar. It says that Malo keeps
to his own place, Malo does not trespass in another man's property.
Malo keeps his hands to himself. He does not touch what is not
his. He does not permit his feet to carry him towards other men's
property. His hands are not grasping. He holds them back. He
does not wander from his path. He walks on tip-toe, silent and
careful, leaving no signs to tell that this is the way he took".
David explains that since colonisation there have been two laws,
"the white man's law and Malo's law". Malo's law is respectful
of people's history and connection with the land. The white man's
law is strong. It believes might is right. Those who believe in
Malo's law have to convince those who practise the white man's law
that Malo's law is right. Might alone is not right.
In this Age of terror, there are some politcial leaders who believe
that the will of the United States is supreme. There are others
who urge a return to multi-lateralism. The law and will of the
Coalition of the Willing has to be brought into line with the law
and will of the international community, co-operating through the
strenghtening of the United Nations and the international law criteria
justifying humanitarian intervention and preemptive strikes against
terrorist threats.
Church leaders, responsible civil servants, the courts, the Senate,
an independent media, and a robust civil society are entitled to
express a contrary view to the executive government of the day,
when that government enlists all of us with a coalition of the willing,
without our consent, even if the majority are satisfied that the
government will do and say whatever it takes to protect "us"
against "them" in tough times. The morality of our engagement
in the Iraq war cannot be left contingent only on two self-interested
outcomes: one, whether our special relationship with the US bears
fruit, and two, whether we are more immune from onshore terrorist
attack. And even if it were so contingent, the jury is still out
on both fronts. Truth and a more coherent morality of war may yet
be even in our own short-term national interest in an Age of Terror.
Jim Wolfenson, President of the World Bank, in an address in February
on a return visit to Australia, his home country, gave us an inspiring
spur to action and reflection for a fair go for all people. He said:
I was fascinated today in my discussions with civil society
to learn that, in a poll of Australian society, eighty-five percent
of people were prepared to support development assistance, and
some fifty-three percent of them supporting it strongly. But when
asked the reasons why they supported it, it was not enlightened
self-interest, it was not protection against terror, it was because
it was morally and ethically right. I found that a remarkable
statistic and a great tribute to the Australian people, in terms
of what drives this country, in terms of its sense of equity and
social justice. We shouldn’t be afraid to say that a ‘fair
go’ or a ‘fair share’ or a sense of equity is something that drives
us. Too few people in the world are doing that today.
Let's take heart from Jim Wolfenson's homecoming observation that
there are so many Australians concerned to assist with development,
and presumably peace, not because of enlightened self-interest nor
for protection against terror, but because it is morally and ethically
right. This is our hope. We honour the memory of Eddie Mabo when
we espouse this hope of justice and peace for our nation and our
world - justice and peace for all under the rule of law which recognises
the dignity and equality of all, even in an Age of Terror.
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